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WORKERS' COMPENSATION-OFFICERS AND PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES: JUROR IS AN APPOINTED OFFICIAL
ELIGIBLE FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BENEFITS
While serving as a juror for the District Court for Cass County,
Janet Holmgren fell down a courthouse stairway, injuring her
ankle.' Holmgren filed a claim for benefits with the North Dakota
Workers' Compensation Bureau.2 The Bureau determined that as
a juror Holmgren was not an employee of the State of North
Dakota and could not be eligible for compensation. 3 Therefore,
the Bureau dismissed Holmgren's claim.4 On appeal, the district
court affirmed the Bureau's decision.5 Holmgren then appealed to
the North Dakota Supreme Court, contending that "a juror is an
appointed official of the state," a term included within the statu-
1. Holngren v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200 (N.D.
1990). The date of Janet Holmgren's fall and resulting injury was January 4, 1988.
Appellant's Brief at A2, Holmgren v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 455
N.W.2d 200 (N.D. 1990) (No. 890307) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
2. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 201. In a letter to HolIngren's attorney, Mr. Al Baker,
dated September 19, 1988, Assistant Attorney General Terry Adkins informed Mr. Baker
that although jurors were not provided for under the state's workers' compensation
coverage as of January of 1988, the Workers' Compensation Bureau had informed Mr.
Adkins' office that the Bureau would "consider a juror as an employee of the county for
purposes of Workers Compensation coverage." Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at A2. The
Bureau had assured Mr. Adkins that should Janet Holmgren file a claim for the injury she
suffered as a district court juror, the Bureau would consider her insured. Id. Furthermore,
the Bureau would consider Cass County an insured employer because the county provided
workers' compensation coverage for its other employees. Id. Holmgren then filed her
claim for workers' compensation benefits on November 18, 1988, naming Cass County as
her employer. Id. at A2.
In a correspondence to the Cass County Court House, dated December 15, 1988, the
Bureau confirmed that it was treating Janet Holmgren as an employee of Cass County
during the time she served as a juror. Id. at All. In a reply to the Bureau, dated February
1, 1989, the Cass County State's Attorney denied that Cass County was Holmgren's
employer at the time of her injury. Id. at A14. The Cass County State's Attorney argued
that because Holmgren had been summoned as a juror by the district court, rather than the
county court, the State of North Dakota was her employer. Id. On February 21, 1989, the
North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau dismissed Janet Holmgren's claim for
benefits. Id. at A15.
3. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 202. In its findings of fact, the North Dakota Workers'
Compensation Bureau determined that Holmgren's injury occurred in the course of her
duties as a juror. Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at A3. However, there was no master-
servant relationship between the state and Holmgren because the state lacked control over
how Holmgren performed her duties as a juror. Id. at A4. Furthermore, the Bureau
determined that, as a juror, Holmgren was not paid a wage; rather, the state merely
reimbursed her for her expenses. Id. at A3. The Bureau's final finding of fact was that jury
duty was a civic responsibility rather than an employment. Id. at A4. Consequently, the
Bureau found that Holmgren was not an employee of the state for purposes of workers'
compensation.
4. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 201.
5. Id. The district court determined that "[a] reasoning mind could have reasonably
determined that Holmgren was not an employee while acting as a juror in District Court.
The decision of the Bureau is supported by the evidence and is in accordance with the law."
Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at A6.
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tory definition of "employee" under North Dakota's worker's com-
pensation law.6 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the district court and held that a juror is eligible for
workers' compensation benefits as an appointed official and there-
fore an employee of the state.' Holmgren v. North Dakota Work-
ers Compensation Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200 (N.D. 1990).
When confronted with a juror injured while on jury duty,
courts have analyzed in different ways whether the juror should be
allowed to claim benefits under the applicable workers' compensa-
tion statute.8 The statutory language defining what constitutes an
"employee" normally controls the analysis.' Workers' compensa-
tion statutes commonly define "employee" as any person serving
the state or any county under an "appointment" or "contract of
hire."10 This language leads a court to examine if there exists
6. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 202. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(14) (1987 & Supp.
1989). The North Dakota Century Code provides that:
'Employee' means every person engaged in a hazardous employment under
any appointment, contract of hire, or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or
written, and:
a. The term includes:
(1) All elective and appointed officials of this state and its political
subdivisions, including municipal corporations and including members of the
legislative assembly, all elective officials of the several counties of this state, and
all elective peace officers of any city.
Id.
7. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 205. For the North Dakota Supreme Court's scope of
review from decisions of administrative agencies, see Cody v. North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, 413 N.W.2d 316, 318 (N.D. 1987) (supreme court does not substitute
its judgment for that of the agency; nor does it make its own independent findings of fact).
8. E.g., Board of Commissioners v. Evans, 99 Colo. 83, 60 P.2d 225 (1939) (test was
whether employee was serving under an appointment or contract either express or
implied); Hicks v. Guilford County, 267 N.C. 364, ._ 148 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1966) (test was
whether the county had any control over or right to control over the manner in which juror
performed duties); Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Rogers, 122 Ohio St. 134, -, 171 N.E.
35, 36 (1930) (test was whether the method of selecting jurors for jury service constituted an
appointment of hire); Bolin v. Kitsap County, 114 Wash. 2d 70, _ 785 P.2d 805, 807 (1990)
(jurors were employees of the county because of their responsibilities to the court judges,
who, in turn, are officials of both state and county).
9. See Board of Commissioners v. Evans, 99 Colo. 83, __, 60 P.2d 225, 226 (1936)
(employee defined as any person serving under appointment or contract of hire);
Lockerman v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 195, -, 377 A.2d 1177, 1181 (1977)
(employee is every person serving under any contract of hire and any official or officer
whether elected or appointed); Jochen v. County of Saginaw, 363 Mich. 648, 110 N.W.2d
780 (1961) (employee construed to mean any person under an appointment or contract of
hire); Hicks v. Guilford County, 267 N.C. 364, -, 148 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1966) (employee
means any person serving under an appointment or contract of hire).
10. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(14) (1987 & Supp. 1989) (defining "employee" as
every person engaged in a hazardous employment under any appointment, contract of
hire, or apprenticeship, express or implied ...."). See also Board of Commissioners v.
Evans, 99 Colo. 83, 60 P.2d 225 (1936) (Colorado workers' compensation statute defines
employee as every person in service of state or county under appointment or contract of
hire); Jeansonne v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 354 So.2d 619 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (provisions
of Louisiana workers' compensation law apply to every person in service to state or political
subdivision under an appointment or contract of hire); Lockerman v. Prince George's
County, 281 Md. 195, 377 A.2d 1177 (1977) (employees subject to Maryland workers'
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between the juror and the county or state the traditional indica-
tions of an employer-employee relationship." The traditional
indications of an employer-employee relationship include mutual
consent to enter into an agreement of servitude and the
employer's control over or right to control the employee's per-
formance of the work."2 Of the courts which have followed this
analysis, not one has found that an employee-employer relation-
ship existed between a juror and the state or the county; accord-
ingly, not one of them has compensated an injured juror under a
state workers' compensation law.' 3
The first court to analyze the nature of the relationship
between juror and the county or state was the Colorado Supreme
Court in Board of Commissioners v. Evans.'4 The state Work-
men's Compensation Act defined "employee" as "[e]very person
in the service of the state, or of any county... under.., contract
for hire, express or implied .... ,15 Focusing on the type of rela-
tionship between the juror and the county, the court found that
compensation law include persons in service of any political subdivision under any contract
for hire and every official whether appointed or elected); Jochen v. County of Saginaw, 363
Mich. 648, 110 N.W.2d 780 (1961) (employee defined in Michigan workers' compensation
statute as every person in service to state or county under appointment or contract of hire);
Hicks v. Guilford County, 267 N.C. 364,_, 148 S.E.2d 240,242 (1966) (employee defined in
North Carolina workers' compensation statute as "every person engaged in an employment
under any appointment or contract of hire .... ); Industrial Commissioners v. Rogers, 122
Ohio St. 134, 171 N.E. 35 (1930) (Ohio workers' compensation statute defines employee as
any person in service to state or county under appointment or contract of hire). But cf
Bolin v. Kitsap County, 114 Wash. 2d 70, _ 785 P.2d 805, 807 (1990) (Washington's
workmen's compensation statute does not define employment as appointment or contract
for hire).
11. See 81 AM. JuR. 2d, Workmen's Compensation § 153 (1976). Under a statute that
defines employee as every person in the service of another, there must exist at the time of
the injury an employment contract, express or implied, between the employer and the
injured employee. Id.
12. See 53 AM. Jun. 2d, Master and Servant § 2 (1970). There are four elements at
common law used to determine whether or not the relationship of master and servant
(employer and employee) exists: "the selection and engagement of the servant, the
payment of wages, the power of dismissal, the power of control of the servants' conduct...
I Id. at 82.
13. See Board of Commissioners v. Evans, 99 Colo. 83, 60 P.2d 225 (1936) (juror not an
employee of county because no employment contract between parties); Lockerman v.
Prince George's County, 281 Md. 195, 377 A.2d 1177 (1977) (no employment contract
existed between juror and county because juror was compelled by law to serve); In re
O'Malley's Case, 361 Mass. 504, 281 N.E.2d 277 (1972) (juror not an employee because
county lacked control or right to control manner in which juror performed duties); Hicks v.
Guilford County, 267 N.C. 364, 148 S.E.2d 240 (1966) (no evidence that employer-
employee relationship existed between county and juror).
14. 99 Colo. 83, 60 P.2d 225 (1936). In Evans a juror contracted pneumonia when he
was sequestered overnight in a jail without a blanket. Board of Commissioners v. Evans, 99
Colo. 83, -, 60 P.2d 225, 226 (1936).
15. Evans, 99 Colo. at -, 60 P.2d at 226. The Colorado workmen's compensation
statute construed by the Evans court also included as employees those serving under an
appointment. Id.
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jurors were not contracted for hire by the county. 16 Rather, jurors
were selected, summoned and compensated, all pursuant to stat-
ute.17 Moreover, the county did not negotiate with the juror for
his services; nor had the juror applied for the employment.' 8 The
parties never discussed when the juror would serve, how long that
service would last, or the amount of compensation. 19 Finally, the
deliberations and verdict made by the jurors were not subject to
control of the county or any other authority.20 Without negotia-
tions between the parties, an application for employment, volun-
tary service, and a right to control, a contractual relationship did
not exist between the juror and the county; therefore, a juror was
not an employee of the county and, thus, ineligible to claim work-
ers' compensation benefits. 2'
In Hicks v. Guilford County,2 a juror was injured between
the time the jury retired for deliberations and when the jury
returned to the courtroom to render a verdict. 23 The North Caro-
lina Workmen's Compensation Act provided that the term
"employee" included "every person engaged in an employment
under any appointment .... [A]s relating to municipal corpora-
tions and political subdivisions of the State, the term 'employee'
shall include all officers and employees .... "24 The North Carolina
16. Id. Before a person can be considered an employee under a workers'
compensation act, an express or implied contract or employment agreement must exist
between the employer and the employee. 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 65, at 280
(1958).
17. Evans, 99 Colo. at -, 60 P.2d at 226. The Evans court further noted that because a
juror cannot decline jury service, jury duty was a statutory obligation rather than a
bargained for employment contract. Id. at -, 60 P.2d at 226-27. See also 99 C.J.S.
Workmen's Compensation § 65, at 279 (1958) (consent of parties essential element of parties
employment contract).
18. Evans, 99 Colo. at -, 60 P.2d 225, 226 (1936).
19. Id. at -, 60 P.2d at 226-27.
20. Id. In Evans the court stated that because the juror participates in the "gravest
affairs of men," the performance of the juror's duties should not be subject to control by
other authorities. Id. In determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists,
the most important factor to consider is whether the employer has the right to control the
manner in which the employee carries out his duties. 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation
§ 64, at 271 (1958).
21. Evans, 99 Colo. at -, 60 P.2d at 226. The Evans court refused to construe the
statutory definition of employee to include a juror because the legislature had not done so.
Id. See also Seward v. County of Bernalillo, 61 N.M. 52, 294 P.2d 625 (1961) (following
Evans); Jochen v. County of Saginaw, 363 Mich. 648, -, 110 N.W.2d 780, 782 (1961) (Carr,
J., concurring) (relationship between juror and county statutory rather than contractual;
thus juror not employee).
22. 267 N.C. 364, 148 S.E.2d 240 (1966).
23. Hicks v. Guilford County, 267 N.C. 364, __, 148 S.E.2d 240, 241 (1966). In Hicks
the claimant was selected as a member of the jury and sat through the proceedings. Id.
The jury then retired for deliberations and thereafter reached a verdict. Id. Before the
jury returned to the courtroom, claimant went to the washroom where, upon exiting, she
missed a step at the door, fell and suffered injury. Id.
24. Hicks, 267 N.C. at __, 148 S.E.2d at 244. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2) (1985 &
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Supreme Court found that the position of juror did not qualify as
an appointed position because the county officials, when drawing
names from the pool of prospective jurors, did so without regard to
individual qualifications.25 Because there was no appointment for
hire, the court concluded that a juror was not a public official of
the county, and therefore ineligible to claim benefits under the
state's workers' compensation statute.26
In one jurisdiction the court's focus was not on the type of
relationship between a juror and the county, but rather on
whether the position of juror holds and exercises a grant of the
state government's sovereign power. In Industrial Commission
of Ohio v. Rogers,28 Mary Rogers was injured while serving as a
juror when she fell down a flight of stairs in the courthouse. 29 Rog-
ers claimed that as a juror she was an employee of the county
according to the statutory definition found in the Ohio Workmen's
Compensation Act.3 ° The statute broadly defined "employee" as
anyone who serves the state or any county "under any appoint-
ment or contract for hire. '3 1 But the definition of "employee" also
went on to exclude county and state officials.32 Therefore, the
Ohio Supreme Court considered two questions: Whether a juror
serves the state or county under an appointment for hire, and, if
Supp. 1990) (state workmen's compensation statute defines "employee" as "every person
engaged in an employment under any appointment or contract of hire").
25. Hicks, 267 N.C. at -, 148 S.E.2d at 244. In addition to finding that a juror was not
appointed by the county, the Hicks court also determined that a contract did not exist
between the juror and the county because there had been no negotiations between the
juror and the county for the juror's services. Id. Also, the county officials lacked the right to
control how the juror performed his duties Id. at -, 148 S.E.2d at 243.
26. Id. at -, 148 S.E.2d at 244. The Hicks court also applied a "right to control" test.
Id. Unlike the traditional employer-employee relationship, however, the county officials
had no control over or right to control over how the jurors performed their duties. Id. at -,
148 S.E.2d at 243. Therefore, the court determined jurors were not employees of the
county. Id. at -, 148 S.E.2d at 244. See also Lockerman v. Prince George's County, 281
Md. 195, 377 A.2d 1177 (1977). The Lockerman court denied benefits to a juror who was
injured when she fell on her way out of the jury box. Id at _ 377 A.2d at 1179. Examining
the nexus between the juror and either the state or the county, the court failed to find any
evidence common to an employer-employee relationship. Id. at -, 377 A.2d at 1184. The
court reasoned that because a juror was summoned for jury duty, there was missing the
common intent of both parties to create with each other legal obligations. Id. at -, 377
A.2d at 1182. See also Jeansonne v. Parish of East-Baton Rouge, 354 So.2d 619 (La. Ct. App.
1978). The Jeansonne court found that a juror was not an "employee" as contemplated by
the state's workmen's compensation law due to a lack of consent between the parties to
enter into an employment agreement. Id. at 620.
27. Industrial Commission v. Rogers, 122 Ohio St. 134, _, 171 N.E. 35, 36 (1930).
28. 122 Ohio St. 134, 171 N.E. 35 (1930).
29. Id, at -, 171 N.E. at 35.
30. Id. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(A) (Anderson 1991). The Ohio workers'
compensation statute defines "employee" as "[e]very person in the service of the state, or of
any county, . . . under any appointment or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or
written, including any elected official of the state, or of any county . Id.
31. Rogers, 171 N.E. at 36.
32. Id.
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so, whether the juror as an official comes within the statutory
exception.33
To determine whether a juror serves the county under an
appointment of hire, the Ohio Supreme Court examined the statu-
tory process by which jurors were selected.34 The court noted that
in Ohio a jury commission selects jurors by first placing into a jury
wheel the names of prospective jurors.35 The names are then ran-
domly drawn from the jury wheel.3' The court found that the pro-
cess created a definite appointment because the jury commission,
prior to depositing their names into the jury wheel, selected the
prospective jurors "with reference to their judgment and qualifi-
cations as jurors, and with reference to their geographic location
.... ",3' Therefore, the court found that a juror was a person in the
public service of the county under an appointment of hire.38
After finding that a juror was a person in the public service of
the county under an appointment of hire, the court next had to
determine whether a juror was also an official of the state, and
thereby outside of the workers' compensation statute.39 To
accomplish this, the Ohio Supreme Court considered the many
statutory definitions of "officer" and found that all of them had one
outstanding characteristic-that the person possess and execute
some portion of the state's sovereign power.40 The court then
went on to recognize that jurors are finders of fact; they hear and
weigh the evidence presented at trial and ultimately enter a ver-
33. Id.
34. Id. The jury commission places the names of the potential jurors into a jury wheel
to be randomly drawn as needed. Id.
35. Id. For the relevant North Dakota statute, see N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-04
(1974) (jury commission established to oversee jury selection process).
36. Rogers at -, 171 N.E. at 36. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-06 (1974 & Supp.
1989) (jury commission places into master jury wheel names or numbers of prospective
jurors); id. at § 27-09.1-07 (1974 & Supp. 1989) (upon order from the court, jury commission
randomly draw from the master jury wheel names of prospective jurors). See also id.
(prospective jurors must meet certain qualifications: citizen of U.S.; ability to understand
and communicate in English language; no physical or mental disabilities; must not have lost
right to vote through felony conviction).
37. Rogers at -, 171 N.E. at 36. The Rogers court reasoned that by screening jurors
prior to putting their names into the jury wheel, the commission eliminated the element of
chance on at least one end of the process. Id. The element of chance again came into play
when the commission selected out of the jury wheel to form a jury, but, given the screening
process, the drawing of a jurors name at this point in the process amounted to an
appointment. Id.
38. Rogers at -, 171 N.E. at 37. The court was unable to draw a distinction between
the selection of a juror by the jury commission and an appointment of a juror by the jury
commission. Id. at -, 171 N.E. at 36. But the court also noted that the juror's appointment
differed from other positions by law because a juror cannot decline the appointment. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. See IC A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 56.20 (1986) (essential
difference between official and employee is that official exercises part of the state's
sovereign power).
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dict.4 ' The verdict, however, has no legal force until the court
enters it as a final judgment.42 It is the judgment entered by the
court that determines the rights of both the state and the individ-
ual.4 3  The function of the jury is not an exercise of sovereign
power because it cannot make its verdict stand as a final judgment
without a declaration by the court.44 Therefore, as the jury does
not exercise sovereign power, the juror did not fall within the "offi-
cial" exception to the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act.4"
Accordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court held that Mary Rogers, as a
juror, served the county not as an official but rather under an
appointment for hire, and, therefore, she was entitled to compen-
sation under the workers' compensation law.46
The Washington Supreme Court, in Bolin v. Kitsap County,47
joined the Rogers court in extending workers' compensation bene-
fits to a juror injured during jury service by holding that a juror
was an employee of the county for purposes of workers' compensa-
tion.48  The Washington workers' compensation statute first
defines a "worker" to mean "every person in this state who is
engaged in the employment of an employer .... "49 In another
section, the statute gives to "employee" the same meaning as
"worker," but includes "all officers of the state ... counties ... or
political subdivisions. "50
However, unlike many other states' workers' compensation
statutes, the Washington statute does not qualify the term
"employment" with the phrase "appointment or contract for
41. Rogers at -, 171 N.E. at 36. The Rogers court found the duties of the jury -
hearing and weighing evidence and rendering a verdict - constituted important
preliminary steps eventually resulting in a judgment entered by the court. Id. However,
the court found that the jurors' duties were no more important than duties performed by
deputy clerks and deputy sheriffs, evidenced by the fact that any of the duties, including
the jurors', may be waived by a party to the action. Id.
42. Id.
43. Rogers at -, 171 N.E. at 36.
44. Id.
45. Id. The Industrial Commission contended that in Ohio jurors were quasi-state
officials because they performed some of the duties of the sovereign state government. Id.
As a quasi-official, a juror would fall into the statutory exception as an "official" and would
be outside of workers' compensation coverage. Id.
46. Id.
47. 114 Wash. 2d 70, 785 P.2d 805 (1990).
48. Bolin v. Kitsap County, 114 Wash. 2d 70, 76,785 P.2d 805, 807-08 (1990). In Bolin,
a juror was injured in a car accident while driving home after county jury service. Id. at 71,
785 P.2d at 805. In addition to finding that a juror was an employee of the county, the
Washington Supreme Court also determined that the car accident occurred during the
course of the juror's employment because the county was under a statutory obligation to
pay juror's compensation for transportation expenses. Id. at 76, 785 P.2d at 807-08.
49. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.08.180(1) (1990) (definition of "worker").
50. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.08.185 (1990) (definition of "employee").
1991]
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hire."" 1 Thus, in analyzing whether a juror was an "employee,"
the court did not have to examine whether there existed between
the juror and the county an employer-employee relationship.52
Instead, the court focused on the fact that the Washington statute
listed or defined only those types of employments excluded from
its provisions, unlike other states' statutes which list or define the
types of employments included. 3 Reading the statute liberally,
the court reasoned that because jury service was not among the
list of employments specifically excluded from the statute's provi-
sions, it must therefore be included by implication. 4 Conse-
quently, the court held that a juror was an employee under the
state's Industrial Insurance Act.55
However, the Bolin court's finding that a juror was an
"employee" satisfied only the threshold question. 6 The court fur-
ther had to determine whether a juror was an employee of the
county. 7 Instead of focusing on the type of power exercised by
the juror, as the Rogers court did, the Bolin court found jurors to
be employees of the county on account of their responsibility to
the presiding court.58 The court recognized its own previous rul-
ings which held that court judges were officials of the county
because the county pays the salaries of the judges and also the sala-
ries of the courtroom support personnel.5 9  As officials of the
51. Bolin, 114 Wash. 2d at 74, 785 P.2d at 807. See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 51.08.180(1) (1990) (definition of "worker").
52. Bolin, 114 Wash. 2d at 75, 785 P.2d at 807 (discussing Novenson v. Spokane
Culvert & Fabricating Co., 91 Wash. 2d 550, 588 P.2d 1174 (1979)). In Novenson, the
Washington Supreme Court determined that for an employment relationship to exist the
employer must have the right to control the employee's physical conduct in the
performance of his duties and the consent of the employee to this relationship. Novenson,
91 Wash. 2d at -, 588 P.2d at 1176. The Bolin court found that Novenson was not
controlling in this action because, as a juror, the claimant served involuntarily. Bolin, 114
Wash. 2d at 73, 785 P.2d at 806.
53. Bolin, 114 Wash. 2d at 74, 785 P.2d at 807. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-
02(14) (1987 & Supp. 1989) (North Dakota Workers' Compensation statute listing both the
employments included under its provisions and those excluded).
54. Bolin, 114 Wash. 2d at 75, 785 P.2d at 807. See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 51.12.020 (1990). The Washington workers' compensation statute provides that "[t]his
title shall be liberally construed for the purpose of reducing to a minimum the suffering and
economic loss arising from injuries and/or death occurring in the course of employment."
Id.
55. Bolin, 114 Wash. 2d at 75, 785 P.2d at 807.
56. Id.
57. Id. In Bolin, the county pointed to a previous decision, Kildall v. King County, in
which the Washington Supreme Court held that a county was not liable for the torts
committed by a bailiff upon a juror because the county exercised no control over the bailiff.
Bolin, 114 Wash. 2d at -, 785 P.2d at 807 (citing Kildall v. King County, 120 Wash. 472,
207 P. 681 (1922)). In Bolin, the county urged the court to follow the same logic - that the
juror is not an employee of the county because the county exercises no control over the
juror. Id.
58. Bolin, 114 Wash. 2d at -, 785 P.2d at 807-08.
59. Id. at __, 785 F.2d at 807.
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county, court judges exercise control over jurors within their
courtrooms. 60 According to the Bolin court, this arrangement
made jurors employees of the judges, and because judges are offi-
cials of the state and the county, a juror is also an employee of the
county, at least for the purpose of seeking workers'
compensation.6 '
In Holmgren v. North Dakota Workers Compensation
Bureau,62 Janet Holmgren was injured when she fell down a ffight
of stairs while serving as a district court juror.63 The North Dakota
Workers' Compensation Bureau determined that Holmgren was
not an employee because jury duty was a "civic responsibility
rather than an employment. '64  On appeal, the North Dakota
Supreme Court reviewed the Bureau's decision to determine
whether the decision was in accordance with the applicable law.6"
Furthermore, the issue presented in the action was one of first
impression in North Dakota: "Whether a juror is an appointed offi-
cial eligible for workers compensation benefits. 66
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its review by exam-
ining the applicable law-in this case the Worker's Compensation
60. Id. at -, 785 P.2d at 807-08. The court noted that although the county pays half of
a judge's salary, a judge is not a servant of the county. Id. (citing Kildall v. King County.,
120 Wash. 472, 207 P. 681 (1922)).
61. Bolin, 114 Wash. 2d at -, 785 P.2d at 807-08.
62. 455 N.W.2d 200 (N.D. 1990).
63. Holmgren v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200, 201
(N.D. 1990).
64. Id. at 202. Holmgren argued that "although public officials do not fit the traditional
concept of 'employee,' they are, nevertheless, specifically included as employees under our
workers compensation law." Id. Holmgren contended that a juror was analogous to a
legislator in that both provide an indispensable service to their respective branches of state
government. Appellant's Brief at 8, Holmgren v. North Dakota Workers Compensation
Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200 (N.D. 1990) (No. 890307). Also, the compensation for both thejuror and the legislator is determined by statute and based on the number of days actually
served. Id. Within the North Dakota statutory definition of "employee," legislators are
specifically listed as an example of "all elective and appointed officials of the state," butjurors are not. Id. However, Holmgren argued that the list of examples included in the
definition could not be read as exclusive. Id. Rather, the list should be construed as
"representative" of all elective and appointed state officials. Id. Because a juror and a
legislator provide similar services under similar conditions, the legislative intent was also to
include jurors as employees of the state for purposes of workers' compensation. Id. See
Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231 (N.D. 1980) (term "includes" in statutory definition
indicates "enlargement rather than limitation").
65. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 201 (on appeal, court will affirm decision of
administrative agency if agency's findings of facts are supported by a preponderance of
evidence and its decisions and conclusions are sustained by the findings of facts). See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-32-19 (1974 & Supp. 1989). See also Lawson v. North Dakota Workers'
Compensation Bureau, 409 N.W.2d 344 (N.D. 1987) (supreme court looks to decision of the
agency and not to the decision of the district court when reviewing the decision of
administrative agency).
66. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 201.
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Act, found in Title 65 of the North Dakota Century Code.67 Criti-
cal to the court was the construction of the term "employee,"
which the Act defines as "every person engaged in a hazardous
employment under any appointment, contract of hire... express
or implied, oral or written .... "168 The Act also includes under the
definition of "employee" "[a]ll elective and appointed officials of
this state and its political subdivisions ....69
The court began its analysis by examining the statutory defini-
tion of "employee," more specifically, the term "appointed offi-
cial."'7 0 The court noted that section 65-01-02 did not include a
definition of "official"; however, the statute did provide examples
of classes of officials. 7 ' The court further noted that although
jurors are not specifically listed as an example of an "official," the
statute does not specifically list jury service among those employ-
ments excluded either.7 2 Therefore, to show that a juror was an
"employee," and thus within the coverage of Title 65, the court
67. Id. at 202. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01 (1987) (North Dakota Workers'
Compensation statute).
68. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 201; N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(14) (1987 & Supp.
1989). For an overview of states with statutes containing language the same as or similar to
section 65-01-02(14) of the North Dakota Century Code, and considering the same issue as
Holmgren, see Board of Commissioners v. Evans, 99 Colo. 83, 60 P.2d 225 (1936) (employee
is every person in service of state or county under appointment or contract of hire);
Jeansonne v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 354 So.2d 619 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (provisions of
workers' compensation law applies to every person in service to state or political
subdivision under an appointment or contract of hire); Lockerman v. Prince George's
County, 281 Md. 195, 377 A.2d 1177 (1977) (employees subject to Workmen's
Compensation Act include persons in service of any political subdivision under any contract
for hire and every official whether appointed or elected); Jochen v. County of Saginaw, 363
Mich. 648, 110 N.W.2d 780 (1961) (employee defined as every person in service to state or
county under appointment or contract of hire); Hicks v. Guilford County, 267 N.C. 364, 148
S.E.2d 240 (1966) (employee means every person engaged in an employment under any
appointment or contract of hire); Industrial Commission v. Rogers, 122 Ohio St. 134, 171
N.E. 35 (1930) (employee is any person in service to state or county under appointment or
contract of hire).
69. N.D. Cent. Code § 65-01-02(14X1) (1987 & Supp. 1989). For those states with
statutes containing language the same or similar to section 65-01-02(14X1) of the North
Dakota Century Code and deciding the same issue as Holmgren, see Lockerman v. Prince
George's County, 281 Md. 195, 377 A.2d 1177 (1977) (employee includes every official or
officer of state or political subdivision, whether elected or appointed); Hicks v. Guilford
County, 267 N.C. 364, 148 S.E.2d 240 (1966) (employee includes all officers of state or
political subdivisions); Bolin v. Kitsap County, 114 Wash. 2d 70, 785 P.2d 805 (1990)
(employee includes all officers of the state, counties, or political subdivisions).
70. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 202.
71. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(14XaX) (1987 & Supp. 1989) ("official"
includes "[aill elective and appointed officials of this state and its political subdivisions,
including municipal corporations and including the members of the legislative assembly, all
elective officials of the several counties of this state, and all elective peace officers of any
city").
72. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 202. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(14) (1987 & Supp.
1989) (North Dakota workers' compensation statute does not include as "employee" person
whose employment is either casual or illegal; also excludes the employer's spouse or
children presently living with employer).
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had to first find that a juror was an appointed official.7 3
To analyze whether a juror is an appointed official and there-
fore an employee, the court used the criteria first set out in State v.
Jorgenson.7 4 The Jorgenson court determined that state officials:
1) are elected or appointed to their positions; 2) receive their com-
pensation from a public treasury; 3) perform duties which are per-
manent in nature; 4) have their duties set out by statute; and 5) are
connected to the management or direction of state government.7 5
The court then applied the Jorgenson test juxtaposed with the
court's past practice of construing the workers' compensation law
liberally to extend benefits to the injured worker, if within
reason.
76
The court began its analysis with the premise that appointed
officials were those individuals "designated to or selected for pub-
lic office."7 7 The court noted that the process by which an individ-
ual becomes a juror is fixed by statute .7  The selection process
begins when the prospective jurors are drawn from the general
population and instructed to appear before the court.79 From the
available qualified jurors, a jury panel is selected and subjected to
73. Id. When the North Dakota Worker's Compensation Bureau determined that
Holmgren was not an employee of the state while on jury duty, the Bureau necessarily
determined that a juror was not an appointed official. Id.
74. Jorgenson, 25 N.D. 539, 142 N.W. 450 (1913). The Jorgenson court held that
appointees to the State Board of Tax Commissioners were state officers so that the Board's
salaries and budget expenses could be included in the general appropriations bill. Id. at __,
142 N.W.2d at 456. As a test, the court adopted criteria previously used by the Colorado
Supreme Court, in Parks v. Commissioners, 22 Colo. 86, 43 P. 542 (Colo. 1896) to show that
the tax commissioners held administrative powers equal to that of other state officers.
Jorgenson at __, 142 N.W.2d at 456 (citing Parks v. Commissioners of Soldiers & Sailors
Home, 22 Colo. 86, 43 P. 542 (1896)).
75. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 202 (citing State ex tel Birdzell v. Jorgenson, 25 N.D.
539, 142 N.W.2d 450 (1913) (quoting Parks v. Commissioners of Soldiers' & Sailors' Home,
22 Colo. 86, 43 P. 542 (1896))).
76. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 205. See Syverson v. North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, 406 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 1987) (holding was consistent with the court's
long tradition of extending workers' compensation benefits to all those who can fairly be
brought within the scope of coverage). For an overview of the North Dakota Supreme
Court's tradition of a liberal reading of Title 65, see generally Lawson v. North Dakota
Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 409 N.W.2d. 344 (N.D. 1987) (workers' compensation
law should be liberally construed to favor the injured worker if possible); Claim of Bromley,
304 N.W.2d 412 (N.D. 1981) (supreme court will interpret workers' compensation law
liberally); Morel v. Thompson, 225 N.W.2d 584 (N.D. 1975) (workers' compensation statute
is to be construed liberally and reasonably).
77. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 202 (citing State ex tel. Poole v. Peake, 18 N.D. 101, -,
120 N.W. 47, 49 (1909) (broad reading of term "appointments" implies not only designation
to an office or a service, but also the privileges which come with the appointment)).
78. Id. Peake at __ 120 N.W. at 49.
79. Id. at 202-03. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-05 (1987) (jury commission for each
county compiles master list of all lists of voters in the county); id. at § 27-09.1-06 (jury
commission maintains a master jury wheel and places into it the names or numbers of
prospective jurors); id. at § 27-09.1-07 (upon order of court, jury commission shall randomly
draw from master wheel names or numbers of prospective jurors).
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voir dire.80 Those jurors chosen to serve must then swear an oath
administered by the court.8 ' Consequently, by a broad reading of
the applicable statutes, the court found that the selection of a juror
to jury service is commensurate to an appointment to an official
position. 2
With the second part of the Jorgenson test, the court turned
its attention to the source of the jurors' compensation.' Section
27-09.1-14 of the North Dakota Century Code provides that for
their services jurors receive from the state or the county mileage
and a compensation of twenty-five dollars.84 Since it is the state
which pays the jurors, and the source of the compensation is the
public funds, the second prong of the test was satisfied.8 5
The Jorgenson criteria also required that the duties of the
position be of a permanent and continuous nature. 86  Both the
North Dakota and United States Constitutions guarantee the right
of trial by jury, thus insuring the continuity of the juror's position,
notwithstanding that an individual juror may serve for only a brief
period.87 Also, section 27-09.1-15 of the North Dakota Century
Code provides that a juror's services are required by the state
throughout the proceedings until its completion, thereby giving
the duties some indication of stability.88 As a result, the court
decided that the duties of a juror, like those of a public official, are
80. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-14-03 (1987) (when action comes to trial, clerk
draws from jury box ballots naming the jurors, proceeding until jury panel is assembled or
ballots are used up). See also id. at § 28-14-06 (listing of grounds for taking challenges for
cause); id. at § 29-17-03 (clerk prepares the jury box in a criminal trial); id. at § 29-17-05
(manner of drawing the jury in a criminal trial); id. at § 29-17-33 (challenges for cause in
criminal cases defined and classified); id. at § 29-17-46 (peremptory challenges in criminal
cases).
81. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-14-08 (1974) (juror oath in a civil case); id. at § 29-17-12
(number of jurors in a criminal trial and method of swearing oath).
82. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 205-06.
83. Id. at 203 (citing Jorgenson, 25 N.D. 539, -, 142 N.W. 450, 456 (1913)).
84. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-14 (1974 & Supp. 1989) (state pays mileage and
compensation for jurors at district court sessions, while county pays the jurors compensation
and mileage at county court sessions). See also 67 CJ.S. Officers § 8 (1978) (source of
compensation relevant in determining whether position is employment or office).
85. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 202.
86. Id. at 203 (citing Jorgenson, 25 N.D. 539, _, 142 N.W. 450, 456 (1913)). See Wargo
v. Industrial Comm'n, 58 Ill. 2d 234, 317 N.E.2d 519 (1974) (position of judge entailed
duties of a continuous nature, without regard to person actually holding it). See also 67
CJ.S. Officers § 8 (1978) (inherent in the word "public office" is the idea that the duties
performed by the holder be of a permanent character, not transitory, and that duties and
office will long survive the current holder).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (the accused in a criminal trial enjoys right to speedy trial
by impartial jury); U.S. CONST. amend. VII. (right of trial by jury is preserved in civil
proceedings); N.D. CONsr. art. I, § 12 (1980) (in criminal prosecutions, accused has right to
speedy and public trial). See Griggs v. Harding County, 3 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1942) (statute
created office of county highway superintendent imposing duties and powers which were
continuing and permanent in nature).
88. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 203.
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also of a permanent character.8 9
Part four of the criteria set out in Jorgenson required that the
duties of the public office be set out by statute.90 The court recog-
nized that the position of juror finds its source in both the federal
and state constitutions, and statutes further define the function
and duties of the juror.91 Based on these observations, the court
found the fourth part of the Jorgenson test easily satisfied, given
that the North Dakota Constitution created the position of juror
and the North Dakota Century Code defined its duties.92
The fifth part of the Jorgenson test requires that a state
officer's duties must be connected in some way to the direction or
management of government; more specifically, a state officer must
exercise some portion of the state's sovereign power.93 Sovereign
power consists of either "enacting, executing or administering the
law."'94 North Dakota Century Code section 1-01-03(7) provides
that one way the state may exercise its sovereign power may be
through the decisions of the courts in enforcing the common
law.95 As an integral part of the judicial process, the jury shares
with the court the grant of sovereign power, although the balance
of that power favors the court.96 Recognized as the sole fact
finder, the jury, with its verdict, establishes the rights of the parties
89. Id.
90. Id. (applying State v. Jorgenson, 25 N.D. 539, __, 142 N.W. 450, 456 (1913)). See
also 67 C.J.S. Officers § 9 (1978) (an office is the result of a constitutional or statutory
directive, or by a grant of power bestowed upon a political subdivision by the legislature).
91. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, VII (federal constitutional right to jury trial); N.D.
CoNsT. art. I, § 13 (1974) (state constitutional right to a jury trial). For the duties of the
juror see N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-17-12 (1974 & Supp. 1989) (jurors must swear oath to make
true deliverance between state and defendant and to give true verdict according to
evidence presented them); id. at § 28-14-08 (jurors in civil cases must swear oath to do the
same); id. at § 29-21-28 (jurors in criminal case under duty not to discuss matters of the case;
nor can they form or express opinion until case is submitted to them); id. at § 28-14-16
(same applies for jurors in civil cases).
92. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 203.
93. Id. at 204. See also State v. Jorgenson, 25 N.D. 539, _ 142 N.W. 450, 456 (1913).
The sovereign power exercised by the state officer is defined and limited by statute. Id.
The state officers' duties must involve the operations of both the state and the general
public. Id. (quoting 36 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 852 (1910)). See also IC A.
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 56.20 at 9-270 (1986). Professor Larson also
distinguishes an official from an employee by the former's exercising of some portion of the
sovereign power. Id. See also 67 CJ.S. Officers § 8 (1978) (employment distinguished from
office by a grant of portion of state's sovereign power, exercised virtually free of outside
control).
94. See State ex tel v. King, 395 So.2d 6 (Ala. 1981). In King, the Alabama Supreme
Court found inherent in the term "public official" the authority to exercise some portion of
the state's sovereign power, either by "enacting, executing or administering the laws." Id.
at 7. Because a captain in a fire department did not exercise any of these duties, the court
held that the position was not one of state officer. Id. at 8.
95. N.D. Cent. Code § 1-01-03(7) (1987).
96. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 204.
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in relation to each other and to the state.97 Consequently, as an
indispensable part of the judicial process, a jury, like the judge,
carries out its grant of sovereign power through the administration
of justice.""
Having satisfied the fifth and final prong of the test for a pub-
lic official as set out in Jorgenson, the court next examined what
effect, if any, two North Dakota Attorney General opinions had
upon the criteria.99 The opinions set out the difference between
"employees" and "officials" of the state in the context of eligibility
for membership in the state's Employees Retirement System.1"'
The opinions supplemented the Jorgenson criteria by adding to it
the concepts, "importance, dignity and independence." ''
Because the expansion of the Jorgenson criteria is consistent with
the law in other jurisdictions, the North Dakota court adopted the
guidelines to be used to determine public officer status. 0 2 The
court then concluded that because the right to a jury trial is funda-
97. See Erickson v. Schwann, 453 N.W.2d 765 (N.D. 1990) (court stated it would not
invade jury's expertise in weighing evidence and assessing credibility of witnesses). But cf.,
Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Rogers, 122 Ohio St. 134, 171 N.E. 35 (1930) (though
jurors find facts and render verdict, the finality of a verdict is dependent upon entry by the
court).
98. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 204.
99. See N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 304 (March 8, 1966) (reiterating Jorgenson as the criteria
for determining whether employment or office); N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 301, 302 (June 13,
1966) (Jorgenson criteria for determining whether position is employment or office, but
adding "importance, dignity, and independence").
100. N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 304 (March 8, 1966); N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 301 (June 13, 1966).
101. N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 301, 302 (June 13, 1966). The June 13 opinion set out the test
for determining whether or not the position is that of an officer or employment as follows:
1. Official designation by the Legislature;
2. Delegation and possession of sovereign power;
3. Tenure and permanency of duties;
4. Creation and designation of powers and duties by law;
5. Oath or bond; and
6. Importance, dignity and independence.
Id.
See also 67 C.J.S. Officers § 10 (1978) (what distinguishes officer from employee is the
"greater importance, dignity, and independence of the position ... and the fact that the
officer exercises part of the state's power virtually unencumbered by a superior authority).
See also 1C A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw, § 56.20 at 9-270 (1985). Profes-
sor Larson distinguishes an official from an employee by both the official's exercising a por-
tion of sovereign power and the "importance, dignity and independence of his position."
Id. While admitting that both tests suffer from an unavoidable vagueness, Professor Larson
adopts as more fundamental and workable the "importance, dignity and independence"
test. Id.
102. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 204. See also Meiland v. Cody, 359 Mich. 78, 110
N.W.2d 336 (1960) (because officer required to take oath and put up bond, the position is
distinguished from "employee" in the position of officer's greater importance, dignity, and
independence); Vander Linden v. Crews, 205 N.W.2d 686 (Iowa 1973) (position of
Secretary of Pharmacy Examiners "office" because duties must be performed independent
of outside or superior control other than the law itself); Steece v. State Dept. of Agriculture,
504 So.2d 984 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (one factor court must consider to determine whether
person is "public officer" or "employee" is whether position carries high degree of dignity
and independence).
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mental to the American legal system and the preferred method of
fact-finding in criminal cases, the contribution of the juror to the
sovereign function of administering justice is both important and
filled with dignity.10 3
However, a more difficult question for the court was whether
a juror exercised the same kind of autonomy maintained by a pub-
lic officer when discharging his duties.1 0 4 The court noted that the
jury does not mete out justice in an unrestrained manner; rather,
the law, through the court, provides the boundary within which
the jurors must operate.1 0 5 That the holder of the position is held
accountable to a superior does not mean the position is one of
employment rather than an office and should not be the control-
ling factor."° As the position of juror is created and defined by
law, it is the law that controls the performance of the same.10 7
However, like the public officer, also created by and defined by
law, the fact that the jurors' performance is determined by the law
fails to remove from them the power to independently weigh,
examine and act upon the evidence.'08
To flesh out this contention, the supreme court acknowledged
that because jurors ultimately retain the sole authority to deliber-
ate and decide the issues, they are an independent entity within
the legal system. 1 9 The jury is the single unit of the judicial pro-
cess with the power to measure both the veracity of the witness
and the preponderance of the evidence."10 Also, the role of the
103. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMiTrEE ON THE OPERATION OF
THE JURY SYSTEM IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 26 F.R.D. 409 (1961) (noting that it is well-
established that jurors occupy an important position in the administration of justice). See
also State v. Kranz, 353 N.W.2d 748 (N.D. 1984). An important safeguard against the
"overzealous prosecutor" and the "biased, or eccentric judge" is the fundamental right to a
jury trial by one's peers. State v. Kranz, 353 N.W.2d 748, 751 (N.D. 1984) quoting Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 156 (1968).
104. Holngren, 455 N.W.2d at 204-05.
105. See N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 301 (June 13, 1966). The powers and duties of the
Securities Commissioner demonstrates that he is an officer of the state, and the fact that the
Commissioner is held accountable to a superior does not change him from an officer to an
employee. Id. at 303. See also 1C A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 56.20 at
9-271 (1985). In his treatise, Professor Larson explains that to distinguish an official from an
employee, the independence of the position is an important circumstance to consider, but it
should not be the controlling criteria. Id. It is characteristic of an official to carry out his
duties with a certain degree of autonomy, whereas the employer maintains the right to
control every feature of the employer's work. Id. However, very few government officials
do not answer to some higher authority. Id.
106. 67 C.J.S. Officers § 10 (1978).
107. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 205.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Construction Assocs., Inc. v. Fargo Water Equipment Co., 446 N.W.2d 238
(N.D. 1989) (jury determines credibility of expert witnesses and weight given to their
testimony); Erickson v. Schwan, 453 N.W.2d 765 (N.D. 1990) (judge will not remove from
jury its duty to weigh evidence or to assess credibility of witnesses).
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juror in civil cases is to decide the issues of fault, liability and dam-
ages; in a criminal trial, guilt or innocence.'' The court also
found noteworthy the practice of the courts to defer to the jury's
discretion in those portions of the proceedings traditionally
entrusted to them, and their reluctance to overturn a jury ver-
dict. 1 2 Moreover, fearing damage to the effectiveness of the jury,
courts will prevent unrestricted examination into the mental
processes by which the jurors reached their final verdict. 13
Therefore, by allowing jurors to perform their duties restrained
only by the law itself, the jury verdict is preserved and protected;
that degree of independence is characteristic of a public official." 4
Consequently, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that
the position of juror satisfied the Jorgenson test, along with the
additional "importance, dignity and independence test." 1i5
Because a juror is a public official and a public official is an
"employee" under Title 65, the court further held that a juror is
also an "employee" under the Act and thus entitled to claim work-
ers' compensation benefits." 16
The result reached by the court in Holmgren may have been a
natural expansion of the Workers' Compensation Act." 7  The
holding was consistent with the court's tradition of a broad and
liberal reading of the Act."" That tradition in turn is consistent
with a strong policy suggesting that for the state to prosper its
111. See Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219 (N.D. 1989) (in civil cases jury awards
damages, apportions fault and assigns liability); State v. Huber, 361 N.W.2d 236 (N.D. 1985),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1106 (1985) (purpose of the jury in criminal trial is to find facts and
determine defendant's guilt or innocence).
112. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 205. See also Okken v. Okken, 325 N.W.2d 264 (N.D.
1982) (under a motion for judgment n.o.v., trial court must give proper deference to jury's
evaluation of evidence and its judgment of credibility of witnesses).
113. See City of Bismarck v. Bauer, 409 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1987) (juror not competent to
testify to anything said or done during jury deliberations which might have influenced his
decision); Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716 (N.D. 1987) (to force jury to justify its
verdict would have a chilling effect upon the free flow of discussion between jurors during
deliberations).
114. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 205.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See 99 CJ.S. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 27 (1958) (compensation laws should
be construed to extend coverage to all employments which can reasonably be brought
within them).
118. See Syverson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 406 N.W.2d
688, 690 (N.D. 1987) (holding was consistent with the court's long tradition of extending
workers' compensation benefits to all those who can fairly be brought within the scope of
coverage); Lawson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 409 N.W.2d 344,
347 (N.D. 1987) (because intent of Title 65 is to protect injured workers, its provisions
should be liberally construed in workers' favor); Claim of Bromley, 304 N.W.2d 412, 415
(1981) (provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act are to be construed liberally to benefit
all who can be fairly brought within them).
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work force must prosper. 1 9 For the work force to prosper work-
ers must be compensated for work-related injuries.12 0 Accord-
ingly, to further public policy, a juror becomes an appointed
public official of the state, thus an employee of the state, and is
now eligible to receive benefits under the Act for a work-related
injury.'2 1
Furthermore, the Holmgren court employed an analysis espe-
cially well suited to the outcome, a test structured so as to set out
specific elements, but couched in broad terms so as not to unneces-
sarily limit its application.' 22 Additionally, under the Jorgenson
criteria each prong of the test is beneficial in distinguishing an
office from an employment or an officer from an employee, but no
single factor is controlling." a The opposite is also true: The fail-
ure to establish all five parts of the criteria does not necessarily
prevent the finding of an office. 124 With theJorgenson criteria the
court provided itself with the kind of discretion necessary to keep
expanding the coverage of the Act as the various employment situ-
ations present themselves. I 5
But the Jorgenson analysis perhaps provided the court with
too much discretion, now raising the question of how will the test
be applied the next time and with what result.126 This very issue
was presented by Justice Vande Walle in his dissent in Holm-
gren.2 7 Justice Vande Walle noted that the majority, in its analy-
119. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (Supp. 1989) (providing that public policy
demands that employees receive compensation for their work-related injuries).
120. Id.
121. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 205.
122. Id. at 203 (citing State ex rel Birdzell v. Jorgenson, 25 N.D. 539, -, 142 N.W. 450,
456 (1913) (officers are elected or appointed; are compensated through public treasury;
duties are of a continuing nature; officer exercises state's sovereign power; duties related to
direction of state government) (quoting Parks v. Commissioners of Soldiers' & Sailors'
Home, 22 Colo. 86, 43 P. 542 (1896))).
123. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 205 (quoting IC A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW § 56.20 (1986) (in distinguishing office from employment, test of
"independence" helpful but not controlling).
124. E.g., 67 C.J.S. Offwers § 8 (1978) (not necessary that all characteristics of office or
officer be present to make one an officer).
125. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 205.
126. Id. at 206 (Vande Walle, J., dissenting).
127. Id. In his dissent in Holmgren, Justice Vande Walle noted that the majority cited
to Bolin v. Kitsap County, but did not rely upon it. Id. (citing Bolin v. Kitsap County, 114
Wash. 2d 70, 785 P.2d 805 (1990) (finding a juror to be an employee of the county)). Justice
Vande Walle also noted that only one other court besides the Bolin court had extended
benefits to jurors, Industrial Comm 'n of Ohio v. Rogers, but the rational used by the Ohio
court had been rejected by all other jurisdictions. Id. (citing Industrial Commission of Ohio
v. Rogers, 122 Ohio St. 134, 171 N.E. 35 (1930)). According to Justice Vande Walle, the
Bolin court would reach the opposite result were it to apply North Dakota law. Id. As the
Bolin court noted in its opinion, the Washington statute is distinguished from those of otherjurisdictions because it lists only those employments excluded, whereas the North Dakota
statute lists both included and excluded employments. Id. By including both excluded and
included employments, the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act limited the court's
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sis, failed to address the notion that public officials, whether
appointed or elected, assume their office voluntarily, whereas
jurors are compelled by law to perform their services. 128 So noted
by other jurisdictions was the lack of the right of control over the
manner in which the jurors exercised their duties and the lack of
mutual consent between the jurors and the county or state, ele-
ments essential to establish an employer-employee relationship-
whether the state defined "employee" to include an appointment
or a contract for hire.129 The dissent's primary contention was
that without consent there was no contract, and without a contract
there was no employment.1
3 0
The dissent, however, did recognize that because the state
compels it, jury service is considered a civic responsibility, and
therefore the juror should be compensated if injured while on jury
duty. 13  But the law by which a juror may receive benefits should
not be one of judicial legislation.'3 2 Rather, the task should fall to
the lawmakers to provide a specific statue including jurors within
the coverage of the Act, such as the Legislature did in 1985 when
it passed into law section 65-06.2-03, making available Workers'
Compensation coverage to prison inmates and those providing
court-ordered work.13 3 Since a juror is analogous to an inmate in
that neither serves voluntarily, it should be appropriate for the
legislature to provide so by a specific statute.' 34
Douglas W Gigler
tradition of liberal construction principles to instances where employees have been clearly
identified. Id. Justice Vande Walle brought attention to the fact that only a few of the court
decisions in the area of Title 65 concerned the statutory definition of employee. Id. at 206-
07 (Vande Walle, J., dissenting).
128. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 206 (Vande Walle, J., dissenting). See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-09.1-01 (1974) (intent of legislature that "all qualified citizens have the opportunity...
to be considered for jury service... and an obligation to serve... when summoned for that
purpose"). See id. at § 27-09.1-16 (Supp. 1989) (penalties for failure to appear for jury duty).
129. See Board of Comm'rs of Eagle County v. Evans, 99 Colo. 83, 60 P.2d 225 (1936)
(employee under appointment or contract of hire); Lockerman v. Prince George's County,
281 Md. 195, 377 A.2d 1177 (1977) (employee under contract of hire or appointed); Jochen
v. Saginaw County, 363 Mich. 648, 110 N.W.2d 780 (1961) (employee under appointment or
contract of hire); Hicks v. Guilford County, 267 N.C. 364, 148 S.E.2d 240 (1966) (employee
under appointment or contract of hire).
130. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 206 (Vande Walle, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. See id. at 206. Justice Vande Walle noted that if the court were forced to
participate in judicial legislation it should do so in a general manner. Id. At the very least
this would avoid a repetition of what Justice Vande Walle referred to as the "tortured
analysis of the term 'public official.'" Id.
133. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-06.2-03 (Supp. 1989). The North Dakota Century
Code provides that "[a]ny county or city, by resolution of the governing body, may elect to
cover its inmates with workers' compensation benefits in accordance with this chapter." Id.
134. Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 207 n.1 (Vande Walle, J., dissenting). See also Note, A
Time For Recognition: Extending Workmen's Compensation Coverage to Inmates, 61
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N.D.L. REV. 403 (1985). The author notes that most workmen's compensation statutes
require, as a prerequisite for coverage that an employment relationship must exist, with a
"contract for hire" being a necessary element of such a relationship. Id. at 406 n.19 (citing
IC A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 47.10 (1980)). However, because an
inmate enters the relationship with the state or political subdivision involuntarily and does
not consent to the work he performs, the inmate is incapable of entering into a true
"contract for hire," and therefore has traditionally been barred from compensation for
work-related injuries. Id. at 406-07. To remedy this inequity and for other public policy
reasons, the North Dakota legislature enacted § 65-06.2-03, giving political subdivisions the
option to provide inmates with workers' compensation benefits. Id. at 424-25.

